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Abstract
Matrix Factorization has been very successful
in practical recommendation applications and e-
commerce. Due to data shortage and stringent reg-
ulations, it can be hard to collect sufficient data to
build performant recommender systems for a single
company. Federated learning provides the possibil-
ity to bridge the data silos and build machine learn-
ing models without compromising privacy and se-
curity. Participants sharing common users or items
collaboratively build a model over data from all the
participants. There have been some works explor-
ing the application of federated learning to recom-
mender systems and the privacy issues in collabora-
tive filtering systems. However, the privacy threats
in federated matrix factorization are not studied. In
this paper, we categorize federated matrix factor-
ization into three types based on the partition of
feature space and analyze privacy threats against
each type of federated matrix factorization model.
We also discuss privacy-preserving approaches. As
far as we are aware, this is the first study of pri-
vacy threats of the matrix factorization method in
the federated learning framework.
1 Introduction
Recommender systems play a significant role in various ap-
plications, such as e-commerce and movie recommendation.
Matrix Factorization (MF) [Koren et al., 2009b], as a typ-
ical Collaborative Filter (CF) method, has positioned itself
as one of the effective means of generating recommendations
and is widely adopted in real-world applications. Tradition-
ally, for one company, it is essential to accumulate sufficient
personal rating data to build a performant MF model. How-
ever, due to the sparse nature of user-item interactions, it
can be hard for a single company to collect sufficient data
to build an MF model. Moreover, recently enacted stringent
laws and regulations such as General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) [Albrecht, 2016] and California Consumer
Privacy Act (CCPA) [Ghosh, 2018] stipulate rules on data
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sharing among companies and organizations, making collab-
oration between companies by sharing personal rating data
illegal and impractical.
To tackle the challenge of protecting individual privacy
and remitting the data shortage issue, federated learning (FL)
[Konecˇny` et al., 2016; McMahan et al., 2017] provides a
promising way that enables different parties collaboratively
build a machine learning model without exposing private data
in each party. It addresses data silos and privacy problems to-
gether. In FL, data can be partitioned horizontally (example-
partitioned) or vertically (feature-partitioned) into different
parties. When records are not aligned between parties and
the feature spaces among parties are heterogeneous, feder-
ated transfer learning can be adopted. The use of FL in rec-
ommender systems has been studied over different data distri-
butions. For example, [Chai et al., 2019] considers horizon-
tally partitioned rating data among clients, which hold ratings
of the same user-item interaction matrix. Federated multi-
view MF is studied where participants hold item interaction
data, item features, or user features [Flanagan et al., 2020].
Each participant holds a part of model parameters, while
some common parameters are shared among participants.
Existing studies generally categorize horizontal and verti-
cal federated recommender systems regarding on whether
user alignment is required before FL [Yang et al., 2019;
Chai et al., 2019]. For example, participants sharing different
users and the same set of items implies horizontal federated
recommender systems. In our paper, we categorize different
settings based on the partition of feature space, as shown in
Fig. 2, which is consistent with other FL systems.
Although most existing studies of federated recommender
systems adopt privacy preserving techniques, including ho-
momorphic encryption (HE) [Paillier, 1999], secure multi-
party computation (MPC) [Payman and Yupeng, 2017] and
differential privacy (DP) [Dwork, 2008] to protect data pri-
vacy. There is little exploration of how data privacy can be
breached in federated MF. It is shown that the gradient present
in the global model is the potential to breach data privacy in
horizontal FL for deep learning [Melis et al., 2019] or logistic
regression [Li et al., 2019]. However, a comprehensive study
of the privacy threats against the plaintext federated matrix
factorization in different data partitions is still required.
Inspired by this research gap, we investigate the potential
privacy risks in federated matrix factorization. Specifically,
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we classify the federated MF into horizontal, vertical feder-
ated MF as well as federated transfer MF based on the data
partition approaches. We then demonstrate how private user
preference data can be breached during FL training to hon-
est and curious participants. Finally, we discuss how cryp-
tographic techniques can be adopted to protect privacy. The
contribution of this paper can be summarised as follows:
• We identify and formulate three types of federated MF
problems based on the way of data partition.
• We demonstrate the privacy threats in each type of fed-
erated MF, by showing how the private preference data
can be leaked to honest-but-curious participants.
• We investigate privacy-preserving approaches to protect
privacy in federated MF.
In the following parts of this paper, section 2 gives related
works of privacy issues of MF method and federated MF.
We give backgrounds of MF and security model in section 3.
Then, section 4 gives privacy attacks to each type of federated
MF. In section 5, we discuss privacy-preserving approaches.
Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 6.
2 Related Work
Privacy risks in general recommender systems are studied in
[Jeckmans et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2006], which analysis
the privacy concerns that happened in different phases and
caused by different entities. However, the federated learning
framework is not considered, which introduces parameter ex-
changes between participants and thus enlarges the attack sur-
face. Though [Chai et al., 2019] investigates privacy risks in
horizontal federated MF and adopts HE to harness the privacy
risks, it assumes honest-and-curious participants, and the pro-
posed approach only defenses against an honest-but-curious
server. We demonstrate that other curious clients can easily
infer private training data.
Many works are exploring privacy-preserving techniques
for federated recommender systems. [Qi et al., 2020] adopts
local differential privacy to train a neural network in horizon-
tal federated news recommendation. [Flanagan et al., 2020]
studies federated multi-view MF over heterogeneous data
held by different participants. [Chen et al., 2020a] explores
a two-tiered notion of privacy by introducing a set of public
users. [Canny, 2002] proposes federated CF based on partial
Singular Value Decomposition and adopts HE for model ag-
gregation. Fully HE [Kim et al., 2016] as well as garbled cir-
cuit [Nikolaenko et al., 2013] is also investigated for privacy-
preserving MF, where secure MF is conducted between the
server and a crypt-service provider. [Gao et al., 2019;
Ju et al., 2020] are the first to investigate the feasibility of the
FL framework to enable a distributed training of deep mod-
els from multiple heterogeneous datasets for brain-computer
interface. Although these works propose various privacy-
preserving approaches, they fail to investigate the poten-
tial privacy loss the intermediate transferred parameters can
breach during FL training.
3 Background
In this section, we introduce the matrix factorization method
based on stochastic gradient descent, as well as the security
model considered in this paper.
3.1 Matrix Factorization
We consider n users rate a subset of m items. For [n] :=
1, . . . , n the set of n users, and [m] := 1, . . . ,m the set of
m items, the user/item pairs that generate the ratings are de-
noted by M =⊂ [n] × [m]. The total number of ratings is
M = |M|. Finally, for (i, j) ∈ M, we denote by ri,j ∈ R
the rating generated by user i for item j. Matrix factorization
uses a d ∈ N dimensional vector to represent a user as u and
an item as v, referred as a profile, and models the relevance
of an item to a user as the inner product of their profiles. MF
computes the user profiles and item profiles ui, vj ∈ Rd fol-
lowing the regularized mean squared error as follows:
min
U,V
1
M
∑
(i,j)∈M
(rij−〈ui, vj〉)2+λu
∑
i∈[u]
||ui||22+λv
∑
j∈[m]
||vj ||22
(1)
for positive constants λu, λv . the inner product 〈ui, vj〉 is the
predicted unobserved ratings rij .
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) is widely applied to op-
timize the profiles ui and vj as follows:
uti = u
t−1
i − γ · (∇uiF (U t−1, V t−1) + 2λuut−1i ) (2)
vtj = v
t−1
j − γ · (∇vjF (U t−1, V t−1) + 2λvvt−1j ) (3)
where γ > 0 is the learning rate. U and V are the user profile
matrix and item profile matrix with each row as a profile, and
∇uiF (U, V ) and ∇vjF (U, V ) can be computed as follows:
∇uiF (U, V ) = −
2
Mui
∑
j:(i,j)∈M
vj(rij − 〈ui, vj〉) (4)
∇vjF (U, V ) = −
2
Mvj
∑
i:(i,j)∈M
ui(rij − 〈ui, vj〉) (5)
3.2 Security Model
We assume all participants as well as the server if there is any
are honest-but-curious (a.k.a. semi-honest). An honest-but-
curious participant follows the protocol honestly but tries to
infer private information from the intermediate information it
knows.
4 Federated MF and Privacy Threats
In this section, we discuss federated MF in three settings that
differ in data partition. Then we investigate how privacy can
be breached towards adversarial participants in each setting.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we consider FL
systems consisting of two participants, PA and PB . Fig. 1
compares the data partition in each setting of federated MF
discussed in this paper. We adopt a sparse representation of
partitioned data in Fig.2, to demonstrate the nature of hori-
zontal, vertical, and transfer federated learning. In the hori-
zontal FL setting Fig. 2(a), participants share the same fea-
ture space. In the vertical FL setting Fig.2(c), participants
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Fig. 1: The way of data partition in federated MF for horizontal federated MF, vertical federated MF and federated transfer MF (assuming
participants shares common item set). Orange, blue, and green rectangles denote the profile matrices of the item, user, and auxiliary
data, respectively. The small rectangles in the user-item interaction matrix represent user ratings.
hold heterogeneous feature space, and only PA holds the rat-
ings. Whereas, in federated transfer MF Fig.2(b), participants
share partial models (e.g., item profiles) for knowledge trans-
fer.
4.1 Horizontal Federated MF
In horizontal federated MF, PA and PB share the same user-
item interaction matrix (i.e., the same user and item fea-
ture space), as shown in Fig 1(a) and Fig. 2(a). Therefore,
each participant holds the profiles of all users and items, and
can locally compute gradient of the whole MF model. Only
model aggregation requires communication between A and
B [McMahan et al., 2017]. In model aggregation, the global
user profiles matrix is computed by UGlobal = 12 (UPA +
UPB ), and item profiles matrix VGlobal = 12 (VPA + VPB ).
PA can compute the gradient∇UFB(U, V ) of PB following
∇UFB(UT−1, V T−1)
=
1
γ
(2 · UTGlobal − UTPA − UT−1)− 2λuUT−1
where T is the index of round. Since the user-item interac-
tion matrix is sparse, that is, M = Θ(n+m), which is much
smaller than the number of potential ratings n · m [Niko-
laenko et al., 2013]. For one update in SGD, it is very likely
to have one rating record for each item or user. Therefore, ac-
cording to Equation 4, PA can easily find the (i, j) pair and
the corresponding vj , by checking the gradient and compar-
ing ∇uiFB(U, V ) to each of {ui}ni=1 as well as comparing
∇vjFB(U, V ) to each of {uj}mj=1. Then, PA further infer
the private rating score by
rˆij = −∇uiFB(U
T−1, V T−1)
2 · vT−1j
+ 〈uT−1i , vT−1j 〉.
This way, PA may complete inference attack and extracts raw
private user preference data (i, j, rˆij) of PB from the plain-
text global model in horizontal federated MF.
4.2 Vertical Federated MF
In vertical federated MF as shown in Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 2(c),
PA holds the user-item interaction matrix, and PB holds
some auxiliary data of users (or items). We adopt the model
presented in [Koren et al., 2009a] to leverage auxiliary data
provided by PB in vertical federated MF. For each user i, PB
hold distinct factor vectors ya ∈ Rd corresponds to each at-
tribute. The user i can thus be described through the set of
user-associated attributes A(u) as
∑
a∈A(u) ya. For vertical
federated MF model, Equation 1 can be modified as follows:
min
U,V
1
M
∑
(i,j)∈M
(rij − 〈(ui + ki), vj〉)2+
λu
∑
i∈[u]
||ui||22 + λv
∑
j∈[m]
||vj ||22,
where ki = |N(u)|−0.5
∑
l∈N(u) xl
∑
a∈A(u). ya is the aux-
iliary information of user i. x is the implicitly preferred item
set, y is i’s attributes (e.g., demographic info).
To conduct federated vertical MF, PB locally computes
and sends ki to PA, and PA sends nothing to PB . Therefore,
PA has no privacy leakage to PB , while PB leaks ku to PA.
In such a setting, user ID leakage during the user alignment
stage causes a major privacy threat.
4.3 Federated Transfer MF
Without loss of generality, in federated transfer MF, we as-
sume PA and PB holds ratings given by different users on
the same set of items, and PA tries to infer private data of
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Fig. 2: The sparse representation of partitioned data and feature space in federated MF for horizontal federated MF, vertical federated MF,
and federated transfer MF (assuming participants share common item set). Orange, blue, and green rectangles denote the profile
matrices of the item, user, and auxiliary data, respectively. The small rectangles represent non-zero values.
PB . That is, PA and PB holds the item profiles matrix V .
PA holds UA, and PB holds UA for their users, respectively.
To train the model, each participant locally conducts SGD
to update local models. For model aggregation, only V is
aggregated by the participants. PA can learn the gradient
∇V FB(UB , V ) of PB as follows:
∇V FB(UBT−1, V T−1)
=
1
γ
(2 · V TGlobal − V TPA − V T−1)− 2λvV T−1
As the interaction matrix is sparse for each round, it is reason-
able to assume ∇V FB(UBT−1, V T−1) = −2uBi T−1(rij −
〈uBi T−1, vjT−1〉) for a user i. By collecting the gradients of
several steps and assuming the uBi does not change, which is
reasonable, then the model is nearly converged, we can use
some iterative methods such as Newton’s method to approx-
imate the numeric value of uBi , as shown in [Chai et al.,
2019]. After computing uBi , the reconstructed rating score
rˆBij of PB can easily be computed as follows:
rˆBij = −
∇vjFB(UBT−1, V T−1)
2 · uBT−1i
+ 〈uBi
T−1
, vT−1j 〉.
Thus, PA completes the inference attack and extracts user
profiles and the corresponding ratings of PB from the plain-
text global model in horizontal federated MF. However, as the
users are not aligned between participants, the user ID infor-
mation can not be inferred by PA.
It is worth noting that, although some works denote par-
ticipants sharing the same set of items and a different set of
users as horizontal federated recommender systems, and de-
note participants sharing the same set of users and a differ-
ent set of items as vertical federated recommender systems,
based on whether the users should be aligned before FL train-
ing. Such setting demonstrates the nature of federated trans-
fer learning, where neither the global model is shared among
participants, nor the feature space is fully partitioned with-
out intersection. Privacy attacks on both settings are the same
during FL training. Therefore, we denote both settings as fed-
erated transfer MF in this paper.
4.4 Comparison
Tab. 1 demonstrates the comparison of three settings based
on the way to update the model, the partition of model pa-
rameters, and the resilience of the FL system against infer-
ence attack. In horizontal federated MF, all participants share
ratings from the same set of users and items. Therefore, each
participant locally holds the whole user profiles matrix and
item profiles matrix for local SGD. For federated transfer MF,
participants only share the same set of users (or items), each
participant locally holds its user (or item) profiles sub-matrix
and the global item (or user) profiles matrix for local SGD.
For vertical federated MF, one party holds rating data; the
other holds auxiliary data, each party holds partial parameters
with shared parameters such as user profiles matrix. For both
horizontal federated MF and Federated transfer MF, clients
can locally conduct SGD optimization without the need for
communication. Participants only need to exchange parame-
ters during the model aggregation process. For vertical fed-
erated MF, two participants need to collaboratively compute
the estimated rating for each update, which dramatically in-
creases the communication cost. The resilience of each set-
ting against the inference attack is also shown. Horizontal
federated MF breaches most private information, including
user ID and user preference data. For vertical federated MF,
recommender PA leaks no information to data provider PB ,
and data provider sends the intermediate data to the recom-
mender. The user ID is breached for both participants. For
federated transfer MF, only private rating data and user pro-
files are leaked, and no user ID is breached.
Problem setting Parameter partition in each party Gradient computation Resilience against inference attack
Horizontal FedMF The whole model params Locally Weak
Vertical FedMF Partial params without shared params Collaboratively PA strong, PB weak
Federated Transfer MF Partial params with shared params Locally Medium
Tab. 1: Comparison of different problem settings including horizontal and vertical federated MF as well as federated transfer MF. FedMF
denotes federated MF.
5 Privacy Preservation in Federated MF
According to the privacy threats investigated in section 4, we
give some advises for privacy preservation in federated MF.
For horizontal federated MF, the global user and item pro-
file matrices computed by aggregation should be protected
against each participant. For vertical federated MF, the aux-
iliary data provider should keeping its computed feature sent
to the recommender secret. For federated transfer MF, the
shared user or item profile matrix should be kept secret to any
honest-but-curious participant throughout the FL training, as
the rating score and private profile can be potentially implied.
To keep intermediate parameters private, there are mainly
three types of approaches cryptography-based, obfuscation-
based and hardware-based approaches. Cryptography-based
approaches generally use HE and MPC to keep intermediate
transactions private. Obfuscation-based approaches such as
DP obfuscate private data by randomization, generalization or
repression. Hardware-based approaches rely on trusted exe-
cution environment (TEE) to conduct FL learning in a trusted
enclave. By using cryptography-based approaches, fully HE
can be introduced to prevent decryption during training [Kim
et al., 2016]. Secret sharing schemes can also be introduced
following a two-server architecture [Damgard I, 2012]. Since
the user-item interaction matrix is sparse, applying DP may
introduce too much noise and make the model unavailable.
TEE can also be applied by encrypting private data and con-
ducting private training inside TEE [Chen et al., 2020b].
6 Conclusion
We identify and formulate three types of federated MF prob-
lems based on the partition of feature space. Then, we
demonstrate the privacy threats against each type of feder-
ated MF. We show how the private user preference data, pri-
vate user/item profiles matrix, and user ID can be potentially
leaked to honest-but-curious participants. Finally, We discuss
privacy-preserving approaches to protect privacy in federated
MF. For future work, we will experimentally study the power
of the proposed privacy attacks by measuring the portion and
accuracy of the inferred private data. Privacy threats against
alternating least squares-based MF and other recommender
systems also require further comprehensive study.
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